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INTRODUCTION
Justice  Clarence  Thomas  is  a flashpoint  for liberals  and  moder-
ates'  concern  about the  ascendancy  of conservative  thought  in  law
and  politics.  Both  have  denounced Justice  Thomas's judicial  phi-
losophy and decisions  in scathing terms since his appointment to the
Supreme Court in  1991.  Justice Thomas  has been  called  a stooge  of
the political  right and  a hypocrite.'  African American  leaders  have
skewered Justice  Thomas  in  particularly  personal  terms,  describing
him as  "look[ing]  black, but think[ing]  white"2  and as  "the Whitest
man in America" in terms of his "political program" and "repudiation
of civil rights."
3  Thomas's jurisprudence in race-related  cases is a spe-
cial target of contempt.  Proponents of affirmative  action are caustic
in their criticisms of  Justice Thomas, in light of his opposition to race-
conscious policies.  That he  apparently was a beneficiary of affirma-
tive  action, but now  denies others  the  opportunities  that he has en-
joyed,  animates  claims  that  Justice  Thomas's  race  jurisprudence
Visiting Associate  Professor, University of Virginia School of Law (2004-05)  and Associate
Professor  of Law  and History,  Washington  University,  St. Louis.  J.D., Yale  University;  Ph.D.,
MA.,  Duke  University;  B.A.,  Furman  University.  Thanks  to Lani Guinier,  Kim  Forde-Mazrui,
Stephen Smith, and Daniel Nagin for  comments on prior drafts of this Essay. This Essay builds
on some of the comments that I made  at the University of Pennsylvania Journal  of Constitutional
Law 2004 Symposium, Race Jurisprudence  and the Supreme Court:  Where Do We Go from Here?
See KEN  FOsKETr,  JUDGING  THOMAS  2,  231-32, 288-89,  297,  314  (2004)  (enumerating  a
number of criticisms of  Justice Thomas, ranging from  his failure to help other black people af-
ter he "made it" to how he "obeys" Justice Scalia); ANDREW  PEYTON THOMAS,  CLARENCE THOMAS
350-52,  360  (2001)  (describing the aggressive  support of the  political right and the vehement
opposition  of liberals  and  some  moderates  to Justice  Thomas's  nomination  to the  Supreme
Court).
2  THOMAS,  supra  note  1, at 351  (quoting Derrick Bell on the television  program, Nightline).
3  FOSKErT,  supra  note  1, at 289 (quoting Derrick Bell  and Manning  Marable,  respectively);
see also id. at 4,  135,  231,  288-89  (likening Justice  Thomas  to  a Judas,  Benedict Arnold,  and
Brutus to the black community).
4 See FoSKETr,  supra  note  1, at 289  (describing criticism leveled by supporters of affirmative
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amounts  to a betrayal.5  Justice Thomas is viewed  as  the antithesis of,
and a most unworthy successor to Justice Thurgood Marshall.6
It  is understandable  why those  who  favor broad-based,  structural
remedies  for  discrimination  reject  much  of Justice  Thomas's juris-
prudence.  Justice Thomas's "originalist" interpretation of the Consti-
tution and libertarian political philosophy lead him  to positions that
break with those favored by liberal advocates of racial justice at almost
every turn.'  This  is true  across a wide variety of Justice  Thomas's de-
cisions, includin  opinions in voting rights, criminal law, and affirma-
tive action cases.
Like many others,  I find much injustice Thomas's judicial record
troubling.  As one example, his concurring opinion in Missouri v. Jen-
kins,9 the  1995 school desegregation case,  strikes me as deeply flawed.
In Jenkins,  Justice Thomas concluded  that even voluntary transfers by
white  students  to  magnet  schools  in  central  cities  were  beyond  the
scope  of a proper  remedial order, despite  a history of de jure segre-
gation and persistent de facto segregation in the central city schools.1 °
Justice  Thomas's  decision  was  driven  by  his  rejection  of what  he
viewed  as the post-Brown v. Board of Education" orthodoxy, which pos-
tulates that, "if integration...  is the only way that blacks can receive a
proper  education,  then  there  must  be  something  inferior  about
See BENJAMIN  HOOKS,  THE  MARCH  FOR  CIVIL RIGHTS:  THE  BENJAMIN  HOOKS  STORY  297
(2004)  (stating that "Clarence Thomas's fast rise was a result of affirmative action").
6  The NAACP opposed  the Thomas nomination.  See HOOKS,  supra note  5,  at 297-309  (de-
scribing discussions of Thomas's  nomination  within  the NAACP and Thomas's attempts  to in-
fluence  the Association's  vote).  Other prominent  black groups,  including the  Congressional
Black  Caucus  and  the  National  Bar  Association  ("NBA"),  were  indecisive  about the  Thomas
nomination.  The NBA's judicial  selection  committee  voted  against  Thomas,  6  to  5,  and  its
board of governors then voted in favor of Thomas,  23 to 21.  The  NBA convention  ultimately
rejected his nomination by a vote of 128 to 124.  See THOMAS,  supra note 1, at 358-59.  But many
civil rights  groups supported  or expressed  no opinion about Thomas's nomination  to  the Su-
preme Court  because  of his  race,  despite  misgivings  about  his positions  on  issues  such  as  af-
firmative  action.  This was  because  they presumed  that the  Bush  administration  would  only
nominate  conservatives,  and  they preferred  a black  conservative  to  a white one.  See THOMAS,
supra note 1,  at 351,  357-59  (discussing preference  for black rather than white conservatives).
According to polls, a majority of blacks supported Thomas's nomination, despite  disagreement
with  many of his views.  See FOSKETT,  supra note  1, at 289  (noting perception  that Thomas was
unsympathetic  to  problems  faced by African  Americans);  THOMAS,  supra note 1, at  352,  359
(basing support on various theories).
7 See THOMAS,  supra note  1, at  500-01  (describing  the  growing  schism  between  Thomas's
opinions and that of liberal proponents of racialjustice).  By racial justice, I mean equal oppor-
tunity and substantive  equality for people of color.
8 See FOsKETr,  supra note 1, at 71-72, 288-89,  298, 314,  318  (describing Thomas's  libertar-
ian political  philosophy and his renown as the most conservative justice).
9 515 U.S. 70,  114-39  (1995)  (Thomas, J.,  concurring).
10 See id. at  117-18  (arguing that voluntary desegregation  is  beyond the  scope of the rem-
edy).
1  347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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blacks.' 2  According  to  Justice  Thomas,  this  erroneous  assumption
stigmatizes  African  American  individuals  and  institutions  and  is  un-
supported  by sufficient evidence  demonstrating  the utility of interra-
cial contact  to black students.1
3  That federal judges have  issued "ex-
traordinary"  and  exorbitantly  expensive  structural  injunctions
mandating  school  integration  is,  then, a  misguided  abuse  of power,
according to Thomas.
4
In  some respects, Justice  Thomas's  focus on stigmatic  injury and
his repudiation of the assumption of black inferiority are compelling,
as  I  will  discuss below.  But he plainly  overstates  his case  in Jenkins.
The right to equal educational opportunity articulated in Brown" and
subsequent cases  cuts against Justice Thomas's conclusion  that even
voluntary, cross district desegregation  is unlawful.  Similarly, his cate-
gorical  claim  that  desegregation  is an  ineffective  remedy  for educa-
tional  inequality" 7  is  overstated.  The  structural  injunctions  put  in
place in many school  districts during the  late  1960s and early  1970s,
after years of resistance  to Brown, have  desegregated  some school sys-
tems, including through voluntary transfer programs.
8  Many studies
demonstrate  that  interracial  contact made  possible  by virtue  of the
injunctions  that Justice Thomas excoriates  have enhanced  the educa-
tional and life opportunities  of many African American students.'9  In
his  zeal  for protecting  students  of color  from stigmatic  harms  and
endorsing  majority black  schools, Justice  Thomas  overlooks  the  fact
12  Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 114, 120-22.
3  Id. at 120-23,  n.2 ("[T] here simply is no conclusive evidence  that desegregation either has
sparked  a permanent jump in the achievement  scores of black  children, or has  remedied any
psychological feelings of inferiority black schoolchildren might have had.").
14 See  id. at 124-26  ("Judges  have  directed  or managed  the reconstruction  of entire institu-
tions and bureaucracies, with little regard  for the inherent limitations or their authority.").
15 347 U.S. at 493 (holding that the segregation of schoolchildren solely on the basis of race
is inherently unequal).
1  See Freeman v. Pitts, 503  U.S. 467, 491  (1992)  (requiring an effective  effort to deegregate
before  a federal  court can  partially end supervision  of a school district formerly segregated  by
law); Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284  (1976)  (ordering metropolitan remedy for public housing
discrimination  in city); Swann  v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg  Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S.  1 (1971)  (order-
ing busing to alter school race populations).
17  See Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 132  (discussing an ineffective  school desegregation decree).
18 The success of some plans lasted for a limited period of time due to white  flight and other
demographic changes.  SeeJames E.  Ryan,  Schools, Race, and Money,  109  YALE L.J.  249,  297-307
(1999)  (surveying social science studies documenting shorter- and longer-term benefits of racial
and socioeconomic  integration  for poor minority students  in numerous school  districts  across
the country);  see also GARY ORFIELD ET AL.,  DISMANTLING  DESEGREGATION:  THE QUIET REVERSAL
OF  BROWN  V.  BOARD  OF  EDUCATION  65-67,  105-06,  130  (1996)  (examining short- and  long-
term effects of integration based on test scores and other benchmarks).
19 See ORFIELD,  supra note 18,  at 65-67, 105-06,  130 (discussing relationship  between deseg-
regation and improved life chances).
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that many African American students flourish in integrated  settings.0
I can  think of no  convincing justification-legal,  practical,  or politi-
cal-for  denying  such  students  the  possibility  of integrated  educa-
tion, particularly when  the  contact  is  initiated by whites and  occurs
on a voluntary basis. Jenkins and like decisions have eviscerated Brown
by undermining precedent that sanctions expansive  remedies for far-
reaching harms.2
Notwithstanding  my  disagreement  with  the  views  that Justice
Thomas  expresses  in Jenkins and  other  cases,  I  think  it  would  be
wrong to assume,  as  others seem  to  have  done, that Justice  Thomas
lacks  genuine  concern  about racial equality.  Justice  Thomas has re-
peatedly  discussed  his  experiences  of discrimination  and  expressed
concern  about the  stigma  that flows from  racial bias.2  Thomas's re-
cent public addresses make it abundantly clear that he  is aware of the
debilitating  effects  of  racial  discrimination.2'  Another  clue  to  the
depth  of his  passions  on the  subject  was  revealed  during oral  argu-
ment  in  Virginia v.  Black, a  case  before  the  Court during  the  2003
term, involving  the constitutionality under the  First Amendment of a
statute making cross burning on another's property a felony. 4  Break-
ing his customary  silence at oral argument, Justice Thomas informed
his colleagues  and counsel that cross burning was "unlike any symbol
in our society," intended to "cause fear," and to "terrorize" blacks and
25 other minorities.  Justice  Thomas's  statement was  widely viewed  as
20 See  id. (citing gains  in test scores and life  opportunities of African  American  students in
integrated schools).
2  See Dayton  Bd. of Educ. v.  Brinkman,  443 U.S. 526, 537  (1979)  (establishing a rebuttable
presumption that present racial imbalance was proximately caused by prior intentional, dejure
discrimination);  Keyes  v.  Sch. Dist. No.  1, 413  U.S.  189,  211-12  (1973)  (discussing  how  a city-
wide  desegregation  plan  based  on  segregation  in  one area  affected  patterns  throughout  the
city); Swann, 402 U.S.  at 15  ("Once a right and a violation have  been shown,  the scope of a dis-
trict court's equitable powers  to remedy  past wrongs  is broad, for breadth and flexibility are in-
herent in equitable remedies.").
22 See,  e.g.,  FOSKETT,  supra note  1, at 60-66  (describing  Thomas's  early childhood  experi-
ences in  the segregated  South);  THOMAS,  supra note  1, at 500-02  (describing  Thomas's press
conferences  with  black journalists and a speech  to Tuskegee  University  students  emphasizing
details of his background).
23 See FOsKETr,  supra note 1, at 7,  60-66, 71-72, 292  (describing Thomas's early experiences
with racial stratification  by skin color and feelings of racial inferiority in the segregated  South);
THOMAS,  supra note  1, at 3-4, 320,  357, 400,  500-02  (describing the  controversy  surrounding
Thomas's confirmation  and  his own  assessment  that the experience  was one of the most trou-
bling forms of discrimination  he had ever experienced).  Justice Thomas has sometimes shared
his experiences  in what would seem  to be self-serving ways, most obviously during his confirma-
tion  hearing,  after  allegations  of sexual  harassment  by  Anita  Hill,  a former  employee.  See
THOMAS,  supra note 1, at 4, 368  (noting Justice Thomas's  statements describing his life  in pov-
erty and segregation in Georgia and his claim  that he was being subjected to a "high-tech  lynch-
ing").
24 538 U.S.  343  (2003).
25 Transcript  of Oral Argument  at the  U.S.  Supreme Court  at 23-24, Virginia v.  Black, 538
U.S.  343 (2003)  (No. 01-1107).
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"shift[ing]  the  balance"  in  the  Court's  6-3  decision  to  uphold  the
constitutionality of the statute. 26
In  addition, Justice Thomas  demonstrated  his concern about the
inadequate  educational  opportunities  available  to  low-income,  Afri-
can American  students  in  Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, the  2002  school
voucher  case. 7   In  Zelman,  the  Court  upheld  Cleveland's  pilot
voucher program against an Establishment Clause  challenge,  despite
religiously-affiliated  schools'  disproportionate  participation  in  the
program. 8  Noting that  "failing urban  public  schools  disproportion-
ately affect minority children,"29Justice  Thomas  rejected  the  logic  of
those  who  oppose  voucher  programs  including  religious  schools
based on "formalistic  concerns about the  Establishment Clause" and
a  "romanticized ideal  of universal  public  education."
0   "Most  black
people  have  faced  too many  grim, concrete  problems  to  be roman-
tics,"  Thomas noted." s  In light of the  cold  realities  that poor blacks
face  in  failing  public  schools  and  the "core  purposes  of the  Four-
teenth  Amendment," 2 Thomas  found  Cleveland's  voucher  experi-
ment lawful.
As  his decisions  in  Zelman and Jenkins demonstrate, Justice  Tho-
mas's objections  to  the  agenda favored  by liberal  civil  rights groups
seem to turn on remedial considerations rather than on indifference
to  bias.  He  categorically  rejects  race-conscious  remedies.  Thus, Jus-
tice  Thomas's  support for the  Cleveland  voucher  program  that pri-
marily benefited poor, minority children  turned, in part, on  the fact
that the  program was not explicitly  race conscious.  But he  has ques-
tioned explicitly race-conscious  remedies in school desegregation  and
affirmative  action  cases because,  as  he  sees  it, they are  premised  on
an assumption of black deficiency, and therefore perpetuate  the very
stigma that they are  designed to  remediate.3  Justice Thomas's opin-
26 Black,  538  U.S.  at 358-60;  see  Paul Butler, For Two Justices, Past is Prologue,  LEGAL  TIMES,
June 30, 2003, at 60.
27 536  U.S.  639, 644-53  (2002)  (rejecting establishment  clause  challenge  to school voucher
program  despite  the  fact  that  ninety-six  percent  of  participants  attend  religiously-affiliated
schools on grounds that program did not advance or inhibit religion.)
28  Id.
Id. at 681  (Thomas,J., concurring).
"o Id, at 682.
Id. (quoting THOMAS  SOWELL, BLACK EDUCATION:  MYTIHS AND TRAGEDIES 228  (1972)).
32 id.
33 See FOSKETr,  supra note  1, at 72,  292  (noting Thomas's  insistence  on  interpreting  laws
strictly to avoid double  standards prevalent  in the segregated South  during his childhood);  see
also Grutter v. Bollinger,  539  U.S.  306, 373  (2003)  (Thomas, J., dissenting)  (claiming  that the
stigma associated  with affirmative  action tags  all blacks as undeserving  notwithstanding  qualifi-
cations);  Missouri v. Jenkins,  515 U.S.  70, 119-22  (1995)  (noting studies stating that test score
gap between blacks  and whites has  narrowed as a result of gains in socioeconomic status rather
than  desegregation);  United States v. Fordice,  505 U.S. 717,  745  (1992)  (noting that the elimi-
nation of all racial imbalance  is not required by the Constitution).
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ions about how best to remedy racial inequality in education certainly
are subject to debate.  But his disagreement with conventional, liberal
perspectives  on the best remedies for racial  discrimination does  not
mean that he  is unconcerned about the welfare of African Americans.
Some commentators  are dismissive  of Justice Thomas's claim  that
affirmative  action  tarnishes the achievements  of all minorities  .
3 4  Jus-
tice Thomas may well be guilty of becoming fixated on the concept of
racial stigma,"" perhaps based  on his own  scarring experiences,  and
of mischaracterizing  the  role  that racial  stigma plays  in  the  lives  of
most minorities.  There  is little reason to believe that most affirmative
action  beneficiaries  experience  the  programs  as  stigmatizing.  But
there  also  is  little  reason  to  believe  that  the  stigma  of racist  stereo-
types  is unreal or an  examination  of it unwarranted  within  constitu-
tional jurisprudence.  In fact, the  dignitary harm  flowing from racial
discrimination  and stereotypes  is generating renewed  scholarly inter-
est.
3 7  One recent commentator  has characterized  stigma as the "true
source  of racial  injury in the  United States,"  historically and contem-
porarily ss  Thus, Justice Thomas's focus on stigma may well speak to
new  impulses  in antidiscrimination  scholarship  and advocacy  in the
post-civil rights era.
The heated rhetoric that surrounds Justice Thomas can obfuscate
the depth of his engagement with  the issue of racial inequality.  Jus-
tice  Thomas's  race jurisprudence  should  be considered  on  its  own
terms, if for no other reason than the fact that he can be expected to
34  See Butler, supra note 26, at 59 (arguing that affirmative action is not stigmatizing).
35 See  WILLIAM  G.  BOWEN  &  DEREK  BOK,  THE  SHAPE  OF  THE  RIVER:  LONG-TERM
CONSEQUENCES  OF CONSIDERING  RACE  IN  COLLEGE AND  UNIVERSITY  ADMISSIONS  245-48  (1998)
(finding  that affirmative  action beneficiaries  tend  to support race-sensitive  programs  and  sup-
port further emphasis on such policies).
See FosKETT,  supra  note  1, at 60, 80-81,  135  (describing Justice Thomas's  appearance and
his experiences  in high school and law school);  THOMAS,  supra note  1, at 136,  140-43  (describ-
ing Thomas's law school experience).
37 See,  e.g.,  GLENN  LOURY,  THE  ANATOMY  OF  RACIAL  INEQUALITY  59-61  (2002)  (suggesting
that stigma from racism  lends  insight to contemporary problems affecting  blacks  in America);
Christopher A. Bracey,  Dignity in Race  Jurisprudence,  7  U.  PA. J. CONST.  L.  669  (2005)  (arguing
that dignity  and  racial justice  are  linked  and  that  Lawrence v.  Texas,  539  U.S.  558  (2003)  af-
firmed  the dignity of gays);  R.A. Lenhardt,  Understanding  the Mark:  Race, Stigma, and Equality in
Context,  79  N.Y.U.  L. REV.  803  (2004)  (arguing that racial  stigma  is  the main  source of racial
harm and  proposing  a four-part  test for  determining whether  an  act or  policy poses a risk  of
stigmatic  harm);  Claude  Steele  & Joshua Aronson,  Stereotype  Threat and the Intellectual Test Per-
formance of African Americans, 69J. PERSONALITY  & SOC. PSYCHOL.,  797-811  (1995)  (noting that
minorities under perform on  standardized  tests specifically when reminded of a stereotype  re-
garding their groups' abilities before  test taking).
38  See Lenhardt,  supra note  37, at 809.  For a somewhat different  discussion  of how stigma
relates to African American  experience, which  focuses on  the black  middle  class,  see Tomiko
Brown-Nagin, An Historical  Note on the Soundness of the Stigma Rationale  for a Civil Rights Landmark,
48 ST. LOUIS  U. L.J.  991  (2004)  (discussing how black elites in twentieth-century  Atlanta  devel-
oped flourishing socioeconomic structure within  racially separate  social and economic spaces).
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sit on  the  Court  for at  least  another generation.  Justice  Thomas's
ideas unquestionably will help to shape the future of race relations in
this country.  His emphasis on stigmatic racial harm may present new
opportunities  for  blacks  and  other  minorities  to  seek  equality
through  the  courts.  For  this  reason, Justice  Thomas's  most recent
statements  on  race  and educational  opportunity, found  in  the  Uni-
versity of Michigan affirmative  action cases, are crucial  considerations
as we ponder the Court's future race jurisprudence.
Here, I considerJustice  Thomas's dissenting and concurring opin-
ion  in  Grutter v. Bollinger9  and reach  an unexpected  conclusion.  On
the face of it, Justice O'Connor's majority  opinion deserves  the great-
est attention.  By her swing vote, Justice O'Connor  gave  liberal  civil
rights advocates a victory, snatched from the jaws of defeat.4 0  By con-
trast, Justice Thomas's  dissenting  opinion,  finding the  University  of
Michigan  Law School's  affirmative  action  policies  unconstitutional,
continued  his antagonistic  relationship  with  liberal  civil rights  advo-
cates.4'  However,  a  closer  inspection  of the  two  opinions  reveals  a
more complex reality.  In some  respects, Justice Thomas's discussion
of affirmative  action has more depth and breadth than the utilitarian
justification for race-conscious  policies offered  by the University  and
embraced in the majority opinion. Justice Thomas offers  a racial cri-
tique of law  school  admissions criteria  and opens  the door to an  ar-
gument that univeristies'  knowing reliance  on criteria that systemati-
cally favor whites  should be  understood  as  a form  of discrimination
that is cognizable and remediable at law.  In this way, Justice Thomas
expresses a  "transformative" politics on the issue of access to elite law
school education.42
Professor Charles Lawrence advocates  a "transformative," or struc-
tural,  approach  to  the  systemic  problem  of racial  disadvantage  in a
recent article critiquing the University of Michigan's  defense of its af- S•  43
firmative  action  policies.  This approach would emphasize  the ways
in which  traditional  admissions  criteria  compound  the educational
disadvantages  to which  blacks and  other minorities  are  subjected  in
lower  school  education  and would  recognize  universities'  moral  re-
39  539 U.S. 306  (2003).
40 See Lynette Clemtson,  NAACP Legal Defense Fund Chief  Retires, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.  16,  2004, at
A10  (noting the Director Counsel's willingness to retire after the Supreme  Court's decision  up-
holding  affirmative  action  in  Grutter  v.  Bollinger); David  Savage,  Court Affirms  Use of Race in  Uni-
versity Admissions, L.A. TIMES, June 24, 2003, at 1 (noting that for the first time in recent history,
civil  rights leaders celebrated  a major victory).
41 For this view, see Butler, supra  note 26, at 59.
42 See Charles Lawrence,  Two  Views of the River, A  Critique  of the Liberal Defense of Affirmative Ac-
tion,  101  COLUM.  L.  REv.  928,  940  (2001)  (characterizing  the diversity defense  as  conservative
and perpetuating the status quo).
43 Id. at 963.
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sponsibility  to correct  for this  systemic  inequality.  In  its  own  way,
Justice  Thomas's  opinion  aligns  with  Lawrence's  call  for a  transfor-
mative approach to the issue of racial discrimination in higher educa-
tion. Justice Thomas's rhetoric is significant.4 5  It represents a rare in-
stance  in which  a Justice  has explicitly and  affirmatively rejected  the
deficit  modality  of reasoning  about  minorities'  right  to  equality  in
education. 46
Whether Justice  Thomas's  rhetoric  can  be  deployed  to articulate
antidiscrimination  rights and remedies that he and other members of
the Court would embrace  is,  however, an entirely different and open
question.  I will return  to this  question  in  the concluding  section  of
this Essay.
I.  THE LIBERAL POSITION
The University of Michigan  advanced a mainstream liberalJustifi-
cation for affirmative  action in the Grutter and  Gratz litigation.  The
University set forth its case in two steps.  First, it argued that enrolling
a diverse student body was central to its educational mission.  Accord-
ing to the University, a diverse student body served the utilitarian pur-
pose  of preparing students for the  global workplace  and  a multicul-
tural  society. 48  Second,  the University  argued  that a  diverse student
body cannot be achieved without race-conscious  measures.  Why?  For
the  simple  reason  that  minorities  underperform,  as  compared  to
whites  on  the  criteria  that the university  uses in making  admissions
decisions.  Given the  credentials gap, affirmative  action was  essential
for achieving racial  diversity in selective  institutions  of higher educa-
tion.  More specifically, the Law School argued that it "must consider
the  race  of applicants  because  a  critical  mass  of underrepresented
minority students  could not be  enrolled  if the  admissions  decisions
were  based primarily on undergraduate  GPAs  and LSATs."5 0  Having
4  Id. at 943-46, 954  (noting that the reliance on high school  GPAs benefits wealthier, non-
minority  school  districts which  are  able  to  offer advanced  placement  courses  and  that  SAT
scores operate in an exclusionary fashion).
See infta notes 118-23 and accompanying text.
46  Brown v.  Board of Education, 347  U.S. 483  (1954),  is  the paradigmatic  case of the  deficit
approach.  See Lani Guinier, From Racial Liberalism to Racial Literacy:  Brown v.  Board of Educa-
tion and the Interest-Divergence  Dilemma,  J. Am.  HIST.,June  2004, at 92-118.
47  See  Lawrence,  supra note  42,  at 962-64  (describing  the  University  administration's  di-
lemma in deciding to argue a mainstream liberal approach or a transformative  approach).
See Brief for Respondents  Kimberly James, et al. at  24-25, Grutter v.  Bollinger, 539  U.S.
306  (2003)  (No. 02-241)  [hereinafter  Brief for Respondent James]  (arguing that a diverse stu-
dent body is necessary to fulfill the objective of Brown and reduce stigma and discrimination).
49 See id. at 35-36 (arguing that the LSAT is not a color blind or nondiscriminatory standard
of equality).
See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 318  (quoting Erica Munzel, the University of Michigan's Director of
Admissions).  The test score gap is the more  problematic of the two measures.  See William  Kid-
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framed the problem in this way, the University avoided discussing the
question of whether altering its admissions criteria would enable it to
steer clear of race-conscious  measures.  Instead,  it defended  its  race-
conscious policy as lawful under Regents of the University of California  v.
Bakke1  because  race  was  not the  predominant  factor  in  admissions
decisions.2   The  University's  policies  were  of the  comjetitive,  race-
plus variety that Justice  Powell had  endorsed  in  Bakke,  rather  than
per se unconstitutional racial quotas.54
The  University  largely ceded  the  matter  of discrimination  to the
plaintiffs.5 5   The  plaintiffs'  claims  of discrimination  were  predicated
on the fact that whites, as a group, outperform minorities, as a group,
in the  relevant  admissions  criteria. 5   As noted above,  the University
did not  (and could  not)  dispute  the  contention  that its admissions
criteria  systematically  favor  white  applicants-upper-income-level
white  applicants,  in  particular. 57  Consequently,  the  battle  over  af-
firmative  action in  Grutter  and  Gratz  was fought as  a competition be-
tween higher-scoring whites and lower-scoring minorities.
Framed  in  these  terms,  the  white  plaintiffs were  able  to  claim  a
moral high ground.  Affirmative action could be presented as an un-
fair racial spoils system in which minorities are rewarded  despite aca-
demic  deficiencies.  This  seemed especially  so within  the context  of
the  Grutter and  Gratz cases  because  the  University  of Michigan  de-
clined to justify affirmative  action programs  as remedies for discrimi-
der, Does the LSA T Mirror  or Magnify Racial  and Ethnic Differences in Educational  Attainment, 89 CAL.
L.  REV.  1055,  1095-1100  (2001)  (arguing  that heavy  reliance  on standardized  tests penalizes
minority  law school applicants);  Susan Sturm  & Lani Guinier,  Affirmative Action:  Reclaiming the
Innovative Ideal, 84 CAL.  L. REV. 953,  974, n.85  (1996)  (concluding that high school grades are
more predictive  of college freshman-year grades than SAT results).
5  438 U.S.  265,  320  (1978)  ("[T]he  state has  a substantial  interest that legitimately  may be
served  by  a properly  devised  admissions  program  involving  the  competitive  consideration  of
race  and ethic origin.");  id. at 314  ("[T]he  interest of diversity is compelling  in the context of a
university's admissions program.").
52 The plaintiffs'  expert conceded this point.  Grutter, 539 U.S.  at 320.
53 438 U.S.  at 317-18  (finding Harvard's  program of using race  as one factor  among  many
considered in making admissions decisions lawful).
Id. at 272-75  (finding program  that set aside sixteen of one hundred seats  in each year's
entering class for minorities and that funneled minorities  through  a separate admissions  proc-
ess unlawful).
55 See Brief for Respondent James, supra note  48, at 21-25  (disavowing  remedial justification
for affirmative action but acknowledging persistent racial stratification).
56 See Grutter,  539 U.S. at 316-20  (citing testimony during the bench  trial by numerous deans
and faculty regarding academic performance  by whites and minorities).
57 There  is  a  correlation  between  race,  wealth,  and  higher  scores on  the  LSAT.  See  Lani
Guinier,  The Supreme Court, 2002 Term-Comment:  Admissions Rituals as Political  Acts:  Guardians
at the Gates of Our Democratic Ideals, 117  HARv.  L.  REv.  113,  141-49  (2003)  (drawing  a parallel
between economic mobility and academic performance); Kidder, supra note 50, at 1062-85  (de-
scribing the adverse impact of standardized  testing on minority law school applications); Sturm
& Guinier, supra note  50, at  968-69, 982-97  (arguing that wealth strongly correlates  with SAT
and LSAT performance).
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nation."'  Instead, the University grounded its defense in the language
of today's political  economy, "diversity."59  However,  as the  following
section  describes, other parties to the  litigation sought to disrupt  this
utilitarian frame of reference by raising the problem of past and pre-
sent racial stratification as the defining issue in the cases.
II.  THE INTERVENORS'  CHALLENGE
The  Grutter  litigation  featured  a  coalition  of student-intervenors
that attempted to shift the terms of the debate  in the case.  The Coa-
lition  to  Defend  Affirmative  Action  and  Integration,  and  Fight  for
Equality By Any Means Necessary  ("BAMN")  led the intervention.'
BAMN  challenged the University's justification for affirmative  ac-
tion, and therefore,  the  plaintiffs'  presumption  of moral  superiority
in the debate over minority racial preferences.6'  The intervenors'  de-
fense of affirmative  action  programs struck  at the heart of the plain-
tiffs'  claims of entitlement to admission to the University.  The  Grutter
The University of Michigan  has no history of discrimination against African Americans in
admissions.  See GREG STOHR,  A BLACK AND  WHITE  CASE:  How AFFIRMATIVE  ACTION  SURVIVED
ITS  GREATEST  CHALLENGE  19-23  (2004)  (describing  the  University  of Michigan's  admissions
policies).  However, there  were allegations and evidence  that the University had engaged  in ra-
cially  discriminatory  and  exclusionary  practices  against blacks  and  other  minorities  who  had
attended  the University  over  time.  For  example,  intervenors  placed  evidence  in  the  record
showing  the  existence  of segregated  on-campus  housing,  organizations,  and  activities,  and  a
racially hostile climate on  campus perpetrated by white  professors, students, and staff, all sanc-
tioned by the University through acts of commission  or omission.  In addition, the intervenors
claimed  that the University's  admissions criteria are  discriminatory.  See Brief for  Respondent
James, supra note 48, at 3-5  (describing bias in the University's admissions procedures since the
1950s);  Brief of Respondent Ebony Patterson, et al. at  3,  5-17, 25-29, Grutter v. Bollinger,  539
U.S. 306 (2003)  (No. 02-241)  (same).
59 For critiques of diversity  as a basis for  defending affirmative  action,  see Jack Greenberg,
Diversity, the University, and the World Outside, 103  COLUM.  L. REV.  1610,  1616-20  (2003)  (critiqu-
ing Justice  O'Connor's justification  of affirmative  action);  Lawrence,  supra note 42,  at 964-74
(contending  that the "diversity  defense" of affirmative  action  is  too conservative  a defense  in
light of the racial  inequality  of secondary  educational  institutions);  Deborah  C. Malamud,  Af-
firmative Action, Diversity, and the Black Middle Class, 68  U. COLO.  L. REV. 939, 941-47  (1997)  (ar-
guing  that addressing  race-based  inequality  would more  effectively  achieve  diversity  than  af-
firmative action).
60  BAMN  is a protest-oriented group that links itself to the social movements  of the  1960s.  It
aims to complete  the unfinished  agenda of the mid-twentieth-century  civil  rights  struggle.  See
BAMN,  Liberator Declaration, LIBERATOR:  JOURNAL  OF  THE  EMERGING  NEW  CIVIL  RIGHTS
MOVEMENT,  Sept.  2001,  at 2  ("We  declare  our intention  to  defend  affirmative  action,  integra-
tion  and  all  the  gains  of  the  previous  Civil  Rights  Movement."),  available at  http://
www.bamn.com/liberator/liberator-5.pdf.
61 The  intervenors  consisted  of a  coalition  of several  student  groups,  including  Students
Supporting Affirmative  Action  ("SSAA"),  United for Equality and Affirmative  Action ("UEAA"),
Law Students for Affirmative  Action  ("LSAA"),  and the Coalition to Defend Affirmative  Action
and Integration,  and Fight for Equality  by Any Means Necessary  ("BAMN").  For a description
of this coalition, see Miranda  Massie,  Representing the Student Intervenors in Grutter, JURIST, Sept.
5, 2003, at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/symposium-aa/massie.php.
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intervenors  recasted  the debate  over the  constitutionality  of affirma-
tive  action  in  terms  that focused  squarely  on  discrimination  against
minorities, an issue that the plaintiffs altogether avoided and the Uni-
versity  minimized.  The  intervenors'  defense  pointed  to  the  racial,
class,  and gender bias  that universities  knowingly perpetuate  by rely-
ing  so  heavily  on putatively  "standardized"  tests  of ability in  admis-
sions  decisions. 6
'  They  argued  that  these  criteria  necessitate  race-
conscious admissions policies,  not the academic  deficiencies  of bene-
ficiaries. s  In other  words,  they  argued  that  affirmative  action  ad-
dresses  the  dysfunctional  structure  of  access  to  higher  education.
The  intervenors sought to  turn both the plaintiffs'  case and the Uni-
versity's defense on their heads.
More  specifically,  BAMN  argued that  high-stakes  tests and  other
discriminatory admissions criteria are linchpins of the caste-like  struc-
ture of the American  socioeconomic system.  According to the inter-
venors,  these  criteria  funnel  blacks  and  Hispanics  into  inferior
schools  at  all  levels,  including  K-12  education,  college,  and  law
school,  and  restrict  these  groups  primarily  to  lower-paying,  lower-
skilled jobs."  Thus,  the  very  premise  of  the  plaintiffs'  case-that
whites with better qualifications  faced  discrimination  by virtue of af-
firmative action programs benefiting minorities-was false. 65  It is per-
verse,  they asserted,  to claim that the "problem" that race-conscious
admissions practices address is the limited academic  ability of minori-
ties.i  For the  relevant admission  measures do a poor job of predict-
ing future academic or job performance  of many students, including
African  Americans,  Hispanics,  Native  Americans,  certain  Asian
groups,  women,  and  students  from  working  class  or  poor  back-
grounds. 67  They  are most useful  for efficient  processing  of applica-
See Brief for  Respondent James,  supra note 48,  at 3-6, 38-49  (describing discriminatory
effects of heavy use of standardized tests in law school admissions).
62 Id.
See Greg Winter, The Supreme Court:  The Demonstrators;  Thousands of Students Gather Outside
Court in Support of Admission Policies,  N.Y. TIMES,  Apr. 2,  2003, at A14 (attributing student dem-
onstrations in support of affirmative action  to the belief that the Court's decision would have  a
direct impact on  their lives).  See generally Brief for Respondent James,  supra note 48,  at 33-37
(arguing that an end  to  affirmative  action  would lead to  the immediate  resegregation  of law
schools and subsequently, the profession  itself).
See Brief for  Respondent James,  supra note 48, at 18-20  (arguing  that the plaintiffs'  case
relies on the false notion that the LSAT is non-discriminatory).
See id. at 22-23  (arguing that race-conscious  admissions seek to eliminate the racial bias of
the LSAT and admissions criteria)
67  See Guinier  supra note  57,  at  137-51  (describing  the  inconsistency between  admissions
criteria and student performance);  Kidder, supra note 50, at 1062-85  (finding that standardized
testing has an  adverse impact in admission  of similarly  qualified minorities);  Sturm  & Guinier,
supra  note 50, at 982-97  (finding a strong correlation between wealth and standardized  test per-
formance).  But see Kidder, supra note  50, at  1089-94  (describing study results indicating  that
the LSAT over predicts law school performance  by African Americans and Latinos).
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tions and for predicting the performance  of wealthy whites, males in
particular68  Even the designers  of the test concede  that its measures
are imperfect  predictors  of ability and  are misused  when  applied to
groups for whom  they are poor predictors  of ability, the intervenors
noted.6 9
The  same  groups  for whom  the  predictive  value  of standardized
tests  is  inadequate  are  typically  beneficiaries  of  affirmative  action
policies,  including  those of the  University  of Michigan. 7 0   Thus, for
BAMN,  these policies are necessary  to offset the bias that universities
knowingly  perpetuate  and entrench  by  relying  on flawed  criteria  in
making  admissions  decisions.7'  Affirmative  action  in admissions  is,
then, a form  of distributive  and  corrective justice.72  It promotes  the
integrative  ideal  established  in Brown  v.  Board of Education, a  more
egalitarian  educational structure, and thus a more egalitarian democ-
73 racy.
III.  THE  GRUTTER MAJORITY  OPINION
The  Grutter majority opinion demonstrated  that the  intervenors'
perspective  was  a distant  consideration.  None  of the Justices  who
68  See Kidder, supra note 50, at  1080-1109  (detailing a study showing that the LSAT is a bet-
ter predictor of  white  male performance than minorities).
See Brief of Amicus Curiae  National  Center  for Fair  and Open  Testing  at  10,  Grutter v.
Bollinger,  539 U.S.  306 (2003)  (No. 02-241)  (quoting from a  report by the Law School Admis-
sion  Council  cautioning  that  test  misuse  and  over  reliance  on  LSAT  scores  flow  from  law
schools'  obsession with classroom diversity and ranking by the  U.S. News &  World Report).
70 Michigan's  definition  of underrepresented  minorities  was limited  to African  Americans,
Hispanics, and Native Americans.  See Grutter v. Bollinger 539 U.S. 306, 316 (2003).
71 See Transcript  of Argument  by Miranda  Massie  at  71,  Grutter v.  Bollinger,  539  U.S.  306
(2003)  (No. 02-241)  [hereinafter  Massie Transcript]  (arguing that "[there is]  a systematic dou-
ble  standard  that operates  to favor  white people  ...  [a] nd  affirmative  action operates to offset
that double standard");  BAMN,  Why and  How We Must Defend Affirmative Action, LIBERATOR,  Nov.
1997, at  1 (noting BAMN's  stance  that affirmative  action was implemented  to offset social ine-
quality),  available  at http://www.bamn.com/liberator/liberator-I.pdf.
See Brief for Respondent James, supra note  48, at  41  (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S.  265,  306 n.43 (1978))  (discussing Justice Powell's observation  that a showing of
bias in entry credentials could  be a valid basis for upholding race-conscious admissions).  Some
scholars have  noted  the tension  between  corrective  and distributive justice.  See Peter Benson,
The Basis of Corrective  Justice and Its Relation to Distributive  Justice, 77 IOWA L. REv.  515 (1992)  (con-
trasting and discussing  the relationship between corrective  and  distributive justice).  However,
constitutional  scholars  who  have  written  about  structural  injunctions  in  education,  such  as
school  desegregation  decrees, have  understood  these decrees  in terms of corrective justice, de-
spite its inexact fit.  See, e.g., Paul Gewirtz,  Choice in the Transition: School Desegregation and the Cor-
rective Ideal, 86 COLUM.  L.  REv.  728  (1986)  (discussing  the corrective  approach  of the law  to
remediate effects of past discrimination).
73 See Massie Transcript,  supra note  71,  at 67-70  (defining the basic  question  in  the case  as
whether  black  students  who  suffered  in  integrating schools in  wake of Brown would have  suf-
fered  "in vain");  STOHR,  supra note  58, at 164  (citing Massie's  argument  equating allowing af-
firmative action with  taking a step toward equality, justice, and democracy).
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supported  race-conscious  admissions  policies  engaged  the  interve-
nors'  discrimination claim.  Instead, the majority opinion was framed
in terms  of the  viability and  legitimacy  of our socioeconomic  struc-
ture.  Rather  than reasoning about  this theme with  minorities at the
center  of  analysis,  however,  the  majority  opinion  concerned  itself
primarily with utilitarian concerns.  The decision principally justified
diversity-based affirmative action in higher education as an engine for
advancing national security,1
4  the domestic and global economy,'  and
76 legitimizing the political and legal structures.
The Court disregarded the intervenors'  credentials bias argument,
though it was  undisputed by the  plaintiffs and the University.  In  do-
ing so,  the  majority  rejected  the  intervenors'  attempt  to  cast  race-
sensitive  admissions  as  a remedy for the University's  use of discrimi-
natory admissions  criteria."  Justice  O'Connor  expressed  deference
to  the  Law  School's judgment about  how best  to  assemble  student
bodies with a critical  mass of minority students.  Requiring  the Uni-
versity of Michigan  to  reconfigure  its  admissions  criteria would be a
"drastic" remedy,  she  stated.7 9  The majority's  rhetoric went  beyond
expressions of deference  to  the  University's  expertise.  The  opinion
also  revealed the  majority's faith  that the University's admissions  cri-
teria measure  ability  or  aptitude.  Justice  O'Connor noted  that the
Law  School's  use of race  neutral  alternatives  to the  criteria  then  in
place  at  Michigan  would  mean  "a dramatic  sacrifice  of...  the  aca-
demic  quality  of all  students." 80  The majority  did not  otherwise  re-
spond to the structural critique of selective higher education  that the
intervenors  posited.  Strikingly,  it was Justice Thomas  who  engaged
this issue in his opinion.
IV. JUSTICE THOMAS'S OPINION
Rather than situating his analysis around  the facts as presented by
the plaintiffs and the University, both of which depicted minority stu-
dents as academically  deficient,8' Justice  Thomas's opinion  discussed
74 Grutter  v.  Bollinger,  539  U.S.  306,  331  (2003)  (asserting  that  a  racially  diverse  officer
corps is essential to the military's function  of providing national security).
75 Id. at 307-08,  330-33  (discussing  the  needs  of businesses in  terms  of skills  developed
through  exposure to diverse cultures  and people  as well  as  the interest in opening  the path to
leadership to qualified individuals).
76 Id. at 330-33  (explaining  that education  is the foundation  of good citizenship  which  en-
tails participation in civic life on every level including as the nation's leaders).
See infra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
78  Grutter, 539 U.S.  at 340  (deferring to the  school's judgment that critical  mass cannot  be
achieved through race-neutral means without abandoning selectivity).
79 Id. at 340.
80  Id.
81  See supra  notes 49-50, 55-57 and accompanying text.
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the  structural  factors  that animate  the  push for  affirmative  action.
This is the context that the plaintiffs and defendant avoided, and that
the  BAMN intervenors  insisted was  integral  to  a full and  fair assess-
ment of the  constitutionality  of the  Law School's  affirmative  action
programs.  As  we  know, Justice Thomas  disagreed  with  the  interve-
nors'  argument that affirmative  action  is an appropriate remedial  re-
sponse  to  systemic  bias  in  admissions.  But Justice  Thomas,  alone
among  the Justices,  recognized  the  limitations  inherent  in the  Uni-
versity's vision of equal protection.
According  to Justice  Thomas,  the  University  of  Michigan  Law
School's "need" to use  race-conscious  criteria  to attain a diverse  stu-
dent body was  a  "self-inflicted wound.
82  This  is the major  theme of
Justice  Thomas's  opinion challenging  the University's  claim  that it is
unable to maintain its deep commitment to a racially diverse  student
body without resort to affirmative  action.  The University argued that
it should not have  to abandon  "selectivity" as a "core part of its educa-
tional  mission" in  its quest to  achieve  racially  diverse  learning envi-
ronments. 8 3  Justice  Thomas  seized  upon  what  he  viewed  as  the
twisted  nature of the  University's  argument:  the choice between  "se-
lectivity" and "diversity" was  one of its own making.  But for the Uni-
versity's  heavy reliance  upon discriminatory  admissions  criteria  as  a
sorting mechanism,  the aspirations for diversity and selectivity would
not be in tension.  The precise language of Justice Thomas's critique
of the Law School's argument is worth noting at length.  He wrote:
[N]o modern  law school  can  claim ignorance  of the poor performance
of  blacks,  relatively  speaking,  on  the  Law  School  Admissions  Test
(LSAT).  Nevertheless,  law schools  continue  to use  the test and  then  at-
tempt to  "correct" for black  underperformance  by using racial  discrimi-
nation  in  admissions  so as  to  obtain  their aesthetic  student body.  The
Law School's continued adherence to measures it knows produce racially
skewed  results  is  not entitled  to deference  by this  Court.... Having  de-
cided  to  use  the  LSAT,  the  Law  School  must  accept  the  constitutional
burdens that come with  this  decision.  The  Law School  may  freely con-
tinue  to  employ  the  LSAT and  other  allegedly merit-based  standards in
whatever  fashion it likes.  What  the Equal  Protection  Clause forbids,  but
the Court today allows,  is  the  use of these standards  hand-in-hand  with
racial  discrimination.  An  infinite  variety  of  admissions  methods  are
available  to the Law School.  Considering  all of the radical thinking  that
has  historically occurred  at this  country's  universities,  the Law  School's
intractable approach toward admissions is striking.
84
In Justice Thomas's view, the practice of affirmative  action hides  the
real problem surrounding access to higher education:  the admissions
82  Grutter,  539 U.S. at 350.
83  Id. at 340.
84  Id at 369-70 (emphasis added).
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system  is  fundamentally  flawed.  It is  racially  discriminatory  due  in
part,  he  suggested,  to  universities'  lack  of will  and imagination  re-
garding race-neutral  means of selecting student bodies.  The Univer-
sity's  "standards" constitute  a  willfully  "exclusionary  admissions  sys-
tem."
85
Justice Thomas argued that, if necessary, the entrenched system of
selective  higher education  should give  way to broader access  to legal
education.  According  to  Justice  Thomas,  should  selective  law
schools  continue  to insist  that there  is  a tension  between  selectivity
and diversity,  and that minorities'  underperformance  on admissions
criteria creates this tension, then selectivity should yield.87  "[T] here is
nothing ancient, honorable,  or constitutionally  protected  about 'se-
lective'  admissions," Justice  Thomas claimed.  To the  contrary,  the
history of standardized  testing upon which  the  selective  admissions
system  is based is tied inextricably  to  the nation's  history of discrimi-
nation.8 9   Historically,  "selective  admissions  ha[ve]  been  the vehicle
for  racial,  ethnic,  and  religious  tinkering  and  experimentation  by
university  administrators,"  a way for schools  to "select  racial winners
and losers."9 0  Justice Thomas pointed, in particular, to the use of "in-
telligence tests"  by many of the nation's most prominent universities,
including  Columbia  and  Harvard,  to discriminate  against Jewish  ap-
plicants during  the  early twentieth  century."  The  tests were facially
neutral; but the discriminatory scheme worked  because Jews  "scored
worse on such tests" than white gentiles, as officials well knew.  Thus,
Columbia  officials  could  claim  that  "[w]e  have  not eliminated  boys
because  they  were Jews,"  but had "honestly  attempted  to  eliminate
the  lowest  grade  of applicant." 9 8   It simply had "turn[ed]  out that a
good many of the  low grade  men are  New York City Jews."94  "[T] he
Id. at 361.
See id. at 368  ("The Equal  Protection  Clause  does  not, however, prohibit  the use  of un-
seemly legacy preferences  or many other kinds of arbitrary  admissions procedures.  What  the
Equal Protection Clause does prohibit are classifications made on the basis of race.").
87 Id.
88  Id.
89 See infra notes 90-95  and  accompanying  text  (describing  the history  of testing  methods
aimed at discriminating in admissions decisions).
90 Grutter,  539 U.S. at 369 (Thomas,J., concurring).
91  Id.
92 Id.
9I Id. (quoting Letter  from  Herbert  E.  Hawkes,  Dean,  Columbia  College,  to  E.B.  Wilson
(June 16,1922),  reprinted in H. WECHSLER, THE QUALIFIED STUDENT  160-61  (1977)).
94 Id.  For a discussion  of how anti-Semitism and other forms of racism were used during the
early twentieth  century  to  "standardize" admissions  to  law  schools  and the  bar, see JEROLD  S.
AUERBACH,  UNEQUAL JUSTICE:  LAWYERS  AND  SOCIAL CHANGE  IN MODERN  AMERICA 24-28, 65-66,
95-121  (1976);  see also Daria Roithmayr, Deconstructing  the Distinction Between Bias and Merit, 85
CAL. L. REv.  1449, 1475-94  (1997)  (same).
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tests were adopted with full knowledge of their disparate  impact," Jus-
tice Thomas concluded. 95
Given  the  discriminatory  history and  effects  of these  admissions
measures and his view that the "entire process is poisoned  by numer-
ous  exceptions  to  'merit,"'  such  as  legacy  admissions, 96 Justice  Tho-
mas endorsed  a more egalitarian  system.  "l[T] here is much to be said
for the  view that the use of tests and other measures to  'predict'  aca-
demic performance  is  a poor substitute for a system  that gives every
applicant a chance to prove  he can succeed in the study of law."97  For
Justice Thomas, a system in which all applicants who meet "minimum
qualifications"  are admitted would  be  preferable  to  the  system  cur-
rently in  place.98  Although Justice Thomas  professed  sympathy  for
the proponents  of affirmative  action, 99 he would  not support reme-
dies  for  racial  discrimination  that  cover  up  and  correct  for  a  law
school's  decision  to  rely  on  an  "exclusionary  admissions  system"
known  to  perpetuate  unequal  access  to  schooling. 100  "[T]he  Law
School  should  be forced  to  choose  between  its  classroom  aesthetic
and its exclusionary admissions system-it cannot have it both ways,"
Justice Thomas argued. °
It is  here,  on  the  question of remedy, that Justice  Thomas  parts
company with  the intervenors,  the  Grutter majority, and  liberal  civil
rights groups.  Whereas Justice  O'Connor noted  that requiring uni-
versities to use race-neutral alternatives to affirmative  action would be
a "drastic remedy,"
10 2 Justice Thomas took precisely the opposite view.
Justice Thomas  argued  that universities'  use of race-conscious  meas-
ures was  the more  drastic  remedy. 0 "  Given Justice Thomas's  belief
that  race  consciousness  is  fundamentally  antithetical  to  the  Equal
Protection Clause,0 4 it is preferable for universities to  cease using cri-
teria  that  systematically  disfavor  blacks  and  Hispanics.
10 5  In Justice
Thomas's view, African  Americans  (and others)  are full members  of
95  Grutter,  539 U.S. at 369.
96  Id.  at 367-68.
97  Id.  at 367.
98  Id. at 361-62.
99  Id. at 350.  ("Because  I  wish to  see  all students succeed whatever  their color, I  share,  in
some respect, the sympathies  of those who sponsor the type  of discrimination  advanced  by the
University of Michigan  Law School.").
100  Id.
'o' Id. at 361.
1o  Id.  at 340.
10s  See  Grutter, 539  U.S.  at 364-67  (Thomas, J.,  concurring  in part and  dissenting  in part)
(contending that race-conscious  remedies may impair the learning potential  of African Ameri-
can students).
104  See id. at 368  ("What the Equal Protection Clause does prohibit are classifications made on
the basis of race.").
105  See id. at  371  ("[Tlhe  majority still  cannot commit to  the principle  that racial  classifica-
tions are per se harmful.").
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the  sociopolitical  community,  on  equal  footing  with  whites,  rather
than  special  pleaders.  As  equal  stakeholders,  minorities  and  all
groups  are  entitled  to  an  educational  structure  that facilitates  their
ability to  accumulate socioeconomic  capital, rather  than one that im-
pedes it.' 0 7  Thus, for Justice Thomas, the discriminatory  criteria  that
Michigan employs are the problem.
Justice Thomas  refused to condone  race-conscious admissions not
only because  of his  absolute belief in colorblind  constitutionalism,  "8
but also  due  to his  view  that  affirmative  action  causes  the  separate
harm  of stigmatizing  "beneficiaries."'0 9  Justice  Thomas  viewed  the
University's continued use of racially discriminatory admissions  crite-
ria and  its use of affirmative  action  to correct them as proof that the
University doubted black applicants' abilities."'  Aligning himself with
the  sentiments  of the abolitionist  Frederick  Douglass,'  Justice  Tho-
mas  passionately  rejected  the  University's  condescension.  "Like
Douglass,  I  believe  blacks  can achieve  in  every  avenue  of American
life  without  the  meddling  of  university  administrators." 
2  Justice
Thomas's explicit rejection of the assumption that African Americans
are intellectually and socially deficient  is a welcomed  deviation  from
the apparent consensus, even among many white liberals, that the ra-
cial test gap reflects real racial differences  in ability."3
Whereas the  Court's conservatives, especially justices Thomas and
Scalia,  are  sometimes  lumped  together  without  distinction  by  crit-
ics," 4 Justice Thomas's advocacy of race-neutral  criteria in  Grutter  was,
in  fact,  different  from  the  meritocratic  platitudes  of Justice  Scalia.
Justice  Scalia  uncritically  accepted  the  plaintiffs'  simplistic  views  of
merit  and  their  corresponding  narrative  of entitlement  to  admis-
106 Id. at 374.
107  See id. at 378.
108  See id.
1  See id. at 371-74  (discussing  the stigmatizing effects of race-based classifications  on  black
and Hispanic students).
Io  See id. at  369-70  ("[L]aw  schools continue to use  the  [LSAT, which  they know  produces
skewed  results,]  and  then attempt to 'correct'  for black  underperformance  by using racial dis-
crimination in admissions so as to obtain their aesthetic student body.").
I  Id. at 350  (quoting Douglass's command  to  "give  [the  Negro]  a chance to stand  on his
own legs").
112  Id.
1s  See Kidder,  supra note 50, at 1080-81  (noting consensus  among otherwise sharply divided
scholars that racial/ethnic differences  in  LSAT scores reflect real  underlying differences in aca-
demic or cognitive skills).
114  See THOMAS,  supra note 1, at 462, 499-50, 565-66 (describing Thomas and Scalia's tandem
patterns and Thomas's disagreement  with  criticism  that he is a clone of Scalia).  Interestingly,
some commentators have also  claimed thatJustice  Marshall was a stooge of anotherJustice, Jus-
tice Brennan.  See BOB WOODWARD  & SCOTr ARMSTRONG,  THE  BRETHREN:  INSIDE  THE SUPREME
COURT 47-48  (1979)  (noting that Marshall  often followed  Brennan's  opinions on  finer points
of law).
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sion."5   During  oral  argument, Justice  Scalia  responded  to the  Uni-
versity counsel's defense of race consciousness by instructing the Uni-
versity to,  'Just lower your qualification  standards.  You don't have  to
be the great college you are.  You can be a lesser college if that value
[of diversity]  is  important enough  to you. '" 6  Justice  Scalia's remark
clearly suggested  that the University's  criteria accurately captured dif-
ferences  in applicants'  aptitude."7  Justice  Thomas's  skepticism  that
traditional  admissions'  criteria  measure  merit  sets  him  decidedly
apart from Justice Scalia.
Far from  following  Justice  Scalia's  lead, Justice  Thomas  aligned
himself with the  most radical  voice in the litigation,  the  Grutter inter-
venors  (albeit  without  explicitly  acknowledging  them).""  Justice
Thomas's  stance  also mirrored  the criticism  of the Law School's ad-
missions standards leveled by several of the University's amicus curiae
supporters, including the Yale, Harvard, and Stanford  Black Law Stu-
dents'  Associations,'  the  National  Center for  Fair  and  Open  Test-
ing,  ° '  and the Society of American  Law Teachers. 2
1  Moreover, Justice
Thomas's  rhetoric  resembled  elements  of the  critique  that scholars
on the2political left have made against traditional notions of merit for
years.
115  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 346-49.  Justices Rehnquist and Kennedy invoked the theme  of unde-
serving minority beneficiaries  of affirmative action as well.  See id. at 380-85  (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting); Id. at 389-92  (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
116 See STOHR, supra note 58, at 282  (describing the University of Michigan's  admissions poli-
cies).
117  See id. at 285.
118 Justice  Thomas  did, however,  cite  the brief of several  Black  Law Students'  Associations,
which  questioned  heavy  reliance on  the LSAT.  See Grutter,  539 U.S.  at 370.  In  the interests  of
full  disclosure,  I  should  note  that  I  was  a  member of the  team  of lawyers  from  Paul,  Weiss,
Rifkind,  Wharton  & Garrison who wrote  the  BLSAs'  amicus brief in  Grutter  v. Bollinger in sup-
port of the  respondent,  the University  of Michigan  School  of Law.  The  team was  led by Ted
Wells and included  David Brown  and Melanca  Clark.  See Brief of Amici  Curiae  Harvard  Black
Law Students Ass'n., et. al.,  Grutter v. Bollinger,  539 U.S. 306  (2003)  (No. 02-241),  available at
http://www.umich.edu/-urel/admissions/legal/gru-amicus-ussc/um.html.
120  Brief of Harvard BLSA et al. at 27, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)  (No. 02-241).
IS0  Brief of the National Center for Fair and  Open Testing at  7-25, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306 (2003)  (No. 02-241).
121  Brief of the Society of American Law Teachers at 16-19, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.  306
(2003)  (No. 02-241).
2  See PATRICIA WILLIAMS,  THE ALCHEMY OF  RACE AND  RIGHTS  99-110  (1991)  (describing the
ramifications  of the paradigm  that "white equals good" and  "black equals bad");  Derrick  Bell,
Diversity's  Distractions, 103  COLUM. L. REV.  1622, 1630-31  (2003)  (noting that standardized  tests
are  poor predictors  of academic  performance  and  the  striking  link  between  test scores  and
privilege);  Guinier, supra note 57, at 141-49 (discussing relationship  between  economic  mobil-
ity and academic  performance);  Mark Kelman,  Concepts of Discrimination  in  "General Ability"Job
Testing, 104 HARV.  L. REV.  1158,  passim (1991)  (discussing discrimination  and  meritocracy  in
employment testing);  Lawrence, supra note 42,  at 964-74  (describing  the "transformative"  ap-
proach  to systematic  racial disadvantage);  Roithmayr, supra note 94,  at 1475-94,  nn.84-86 (ar-
guing  that merit standards  incorporate  biases  favorable  to  dominant  social  groups);  Michael
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CONCLUSION
Justice  Thomas's  analytical  approach  in  Grutter  was  concerned
about structural  inequality in the law school admissions  process, per-
petuated by the LSAT-a test that is said to be neutral and objective,
but which in reality  is  racially  stigmatizing. 1 2  In  light of this stigma,
Thomas  suggested  that elite  law schools  should  reassess  their  deci-
sion  to  privilege  efficiency  over  substantive  fairness,  and  therefore,
reconfigure  their admissions  practices.  Thomas's  rhetoric  eclipsed
the liberal defense  of affirmative  action,  which,  as  Professor Charles
Lawrence  observes,  "buttress[es]  the  structure  of race  and  class  sub-
ordination"2 4 and is a "case for the integration of a privileged class. 12 3
In his own way, Justice Thomas embraced  a more  transformative  ap-
proach to educational access-an  approach  that, in an important re-
spect, is  aligned with  the vision of equality  that Professor  Lawrence
advocates.  129
Justice  Thomas's  beliefs  that  the  Constitution  requires  color-
blindness  and that  any and  all  race-conscious  policies breed  stigma
are  subject to debate.  But disagreement  with Justice  Thomas's end-
point  should not  overshadow  the  fact  that  his  opinion  contains  a
forceful  critique  of universities'  knowing  reliance  on  admissions  cri-
teria that poorly measure  the ability of the  typical African  American
and Hispanic, working-class  or poor, law school applicant.  In this re-
spect Justice  Thomas's rhetoric went beyond what the University and
the  Grutter majority offered.
It is,  of course, important not to overstate  the significance  of Jus-
tice  Thomas's  opinion  in  Grutter.  It is  but  one  opinion.  I  do not
mean to equate its highly suggestive  language with a majority opinion
that creates  binding jurisprudence  regarding race-based  admissions.
Justice Thomas's rhetoric  may mostly reflect his expression of disdain
for the white liberal elites and affirmative action policies that he per-
ceives  as  having  tarnished his  own hard won  educational and career
Selmi,  Testing for Equality:  Merit, Effwiency,  and the Affirmative Action  Debate, 42  UCLA L.  REV.
1251,  passim  (1995)  (discussing  affirmative  action  and  testing  in  the  employment  context);
Sturm & Guinier, supra  note  50, at 971-89 (questioning the reliability of standardized  testing as
an  accurate  predictor  of academic  success).  But  see  DANIEL  A. FARBER  &  SUZANNA  SHERRY,
BEYOND  ALL REASON:  THE  RADICAL  ASSAULT  ON  TRUTH  IN  AMERICAN  LAW  (1997)  (defending
traditional  admissions criteria).
123  Grutter, 539 U.S.  at 367  ("[T]here is much  to be said for the view that the use of tests and
other measures  to 'predict'  academic  performance  is a poor substitute  for  a system that gives
every applicant a chance  to prove  he can  succeed in the study of law.").
t2  Lawrence, supra note 42, at 952.
125 Id. at 941.
126  See id. at 964 (arguing  that integration of universities and race-conscious  admissions poli-
cies help to "conquer the scourge of American apartheid").
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achievements.
2
1  It also  is  important  to  note  that Justice  Thomas's
critique  overlaps  with  the  transformative  vision  that Professor  Law-
rence proposes, but does not constitute a coherent vision of equality.
Justice  Thomas  implied that a frontal assault  on the LSAT is  plausi-
ble, but stopped there.  He failed to connect his racial critique of law
school  admissions  criteria  to  an  understanding  of the  Fourteenth
Amendment  that would  reach  and  remedy  the  discrimination  that
these  facially  neutral  standards perpetuate.  That  said, Justice  Tho-
mas's opinion  is certainly  provocative,  and  it would be  a  mistake  to
ignore it.
The  prospective  question  is  whether,  and  under  what  circum-
stances, Justice Thomas  would revisit the  issue of structural  discrimi-
nation in  education, and whether his rhetoric  can be  deployed to ar-
ticulate rights  and remedies  that would  advance  the  cause  of racial
justice.  Justice Thomas will be among the Justices who consider what
are  likely to be new challenges  to  affirmative  action  in university  ad-
missions in coming years.  As Justice  Scalia predicts,  these challenges
will  test the  meaning of Grutter's narrow  tailoring prong.18  There  is
every  indication  that Justice  Thomas will vote  to  interpret  Grutter to
bar  most  race-conscious  admissions  policies  in  higher  education.
Civil rights lawyers  are likely to react to such a development with new
legal challenges of their own.  A frontal assault on the admissions cri-
teria  used  by selective  universities  seems  inevitable,  despite unfavor-
able  case law.'29 Justice Thomas's opinion  implies that he would seri-
ously entertain  such  a  legal  challenge.  In  fact,  his  concern  about
racial stigma  might provide  a basis for attacking facially race-neutral
criteria that, in practice, brands most blacks,  other minoritieg, lower-
income  applicants,  and  some  women,  as  academic  inferiors.  Tho-
mas's approach  opens the door to an argument that these  stigmatiz-
ing criteria should be understood as  a form of discrimination that  is
cognizable and remediable at law.
Assuming Justice Thomas could be convinced that facially neutral
criteria are unlawful  under the Constitution  or federal  statutory  law,
his resistance  to race-conscious remedies would remain.  For him, the
17  See, e.g.,  FOSKETT,  supra note 1, at 60-66, 74-83, 118-24,  130-33  (discussing Thomas's per-
ception that he was stigmatized  by affirmative  action and his shift away from  his formerly liberal
leanings); THOMAS, supra note 1, at 133-38,  140-43, 567-68  (describing Thomas's development
of conservative  views during law school).
128 539 U.S. at 348-49.
19  One such case is  the particularly difficult Alexander v. Sandoval 532 U.S. 275  (2001)  (hold-
ing that there is no private right of action  under Title VI).  See, e.g., Benjamin Superfine,  At the
Intersection of Law and  Psychometrics: Explaining  the Validity Clause of No Child Left Behind, 33 J.L. &
EDUC.  475 (2004)  (discussing the validity of standardized  testing from a psychometric and judi-
cial  perspective).  For a pre-Sandoval discussion of such  a legal challenge  under Title VI  of the
Civil Rights Act, see Roithmayr, supra  note 94, at 1496-1501.
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bias perpetuated  by racially discriminatory admissions  criteria  would
not provide  a new and  different  rationale  for race-conscious  correc-
tive  measures  in  admissions,  as  some,  including  the  Grutter interve-
nors, have argued.'so  Only a race-neutral  remedy would satisfy Justice
Thomas.  Even then, the concerns  that he has expressed about struc-
tural injunctions in the context of lower school and higher education
might limit the  scope  of such  remedies.'  Hence,  even race-neutral
remedies  would  test and potentially  stretch Justice  Thomas's  skepti-
cism  about  systematic  remedies,  notwithstanding  his  potential  ame-
nability  to  an  antidiscrimination  right  against  structural  racism  in
university admissions.
Justice Thomas's  opinions  in  Grutter,  Jenkins, and  Zelman begin  a
complex  conversation  in the Court's  race jurisprudence  about reme-
dies for structural  inequality, stigma, and  citizenship.  His  analytical
approach  raises  some pressing questions.  How  can equal protection
doctrine address the harms arising from racial discrimination without
perpetuating  the harms  associated  with  racial  categorization?  How
can  structural  remedies,  designed  to  rectify  status-based  harms,  be
broad enough  to grant class-wide  relief, but individuated  enough to
preserve personal autonomy and dignity?  These are critical questions
that  courts,  constitutional  scholars,  and  advocates  of racial  justice
must  answer  in  the  post-civil  rights  era.  And  so,  too,  must Justice
Thomas.
130  See Brief for Respondent James, supra  note  48, at 2-45  (arguing for race-conscious  admis-
sions  policies); Roithmayr, supra note 94, at 1496-1501  (suggesting  practical applications of de-
constructive  insights when litigating numeric-based law school admission standards).
131  See supra  notes 9-14 and accompanying text.
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